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Abstract 
Background. Early detection of consciousness after severe brain injury is critical for 
establishing an accurate prognosis and planning appropriate treatment. 










Objectives. To determine which behavioral signs of consciousness emerge first and to 
estimate the time course to recovery of consciousness in patients with severe acquired brain 
injury. 
Methods. Retrospective observational study using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised and 
days to recovery of consciousness in 79 patients (51 males; 34 with traumatic brain injury; 
median [IQR] age 48 [26–61] years; median time since injury 26 [20–36] days) who 
transitioned from coma or unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS)/vegetative state (VS) 
to the minimally conscious state (MCS) or emerged from MCS during inpatient rehabilitation. 
Results. Visual pursuit was the most common initial sign of MCS (41% of patients; 95% CI 
[30–52]), followed by reproducible command-following (25% [16–35]) and automatic 
movements (24% [15–33]). Ten other behaviors emerged first in less than 16% of cases. 
Median [IQR] time to recovery of consciousness was 44 [33–59] days. Etiology did not 
significantly affect time to recovered consciousness.  
Conclusion. Recovery of consciousness after severe brain injury is most often signaled by 
reemergence of visual pursuit, reproducible command-following and automatic movements. 
Clinicians should use assessment measures that are sensitive to these behaviors because early 
detection of consciousness is critical for accurate prognostication and treatment planning.  
Keywords. brain injury, vegetative state, minimally conscious state, outcome 
Introduction 
Severe brain injury frequently results in a period of altered consciousness characterized by 
impaired arousal and awareness [1,2]. Disorders of consciousness (DoC) include coma, a state 
of continuous eye closure and no behavioral signs of self or environmental awareness [3]; the 
vegetative state (VS), also referred to as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), in 
which there is eye-opening but still no behavioral signs of awareness [4]; and the minimally 
conscious state (MCS), a condition characterized by reproducible but fluctuating behavioral 










signs of awareness. Emergence from MCS (eMCS) is marked by recovery of reliable 
communication and/or appropriate use of objects [5]. Detecting the transition from an 
unconscious to conscious state is critically important in clinical management, discharge 
disposition planning and family counseling. Unfortunately, diagnostic error remains high in 
this population, consistently reported to be around 40% [6–8].  
The Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) [9], a standardized behavioral 
assessment scale consisting of 23 items hierarchically organized within 6 subscales that assess 
auditory, visual, motor, verbal, communication and arousal functions, is recommended for 
clinical use in patients with DoC by the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine in 
view of its strong psychometric properties [10]. Diagnostic assessment with the CRS-R has 
been shown to outperform routine bedside examination [6]. Despite the increased sensitivity 
for detecting consciousness afforded by the CRS-R, diagnosis may be confounded by factors 
such as fluctuations in vigilance [11], neuromuscular dysfunction, sensory deficits or 
unrecognized medical complications such as subclinical seizure activity [12]. This challenge 
is illustrated by a recent study involving patients with chronic DoC at approximately 4 years 
post-injury in which the investigators found it necessary to perform 5 CRS-R examinations 
over a 2-week period before the rate of diagnostic error could be reduced to 5% [13].  
The term MCS was first introduced in 1997 to replace the term, “minimally responsive 
state,” [14] to clearly differentiate individuals with at least partial preservation of conscious 
awareness from those lacking any sign of consciousness (i.e., coma, VS). In 2002, consensus-
based diagnostic criteria for MCS were published and included the following behavioral 
features: command-following, intelligible verbalizations, gestural or verbal yes/no responses 
and non-reflexive behaviors that occurred in contingent relation to specific triggering stimuli 
(e.g., smiling or crying to a familiar voice, sustaining fixation on, visually tracking or 
reaching for an object in space) [5]. On the basis of these criteria, the CRS-R was modified 










and now includes 11 items designed to detect behavioral signs of MCS as well as 2 additional 
items to identify patients who have emerged from MCS (see Table 1).  
Early detection of consciousness after severe brain injury is critical to establishing an 
accurate prognosis and planning appropriate treatment. Recovery of consciousness is marked 
by the transition from coma or UWS/VS to MCS. Identifying the first behavior marking the 
transition from UWS/VS to MCS may facilitate clinical decision-making regarding goals of 
care and recommendations concerning specific treatment interventions, including 
rehabilitation. Previous studies have shown that visual behaviors typically emerge first in 
individuals transitioning from UWS/VS to MCS. In a study of 20 individuals with DoC 
undergoing inpatient rehabilitation, 55% were diagnosed as being conscious based exclusively 
on visual behaviors captured by the CRS-R visual subscale [15]. A larger multicenter study 
involving patients in the intensive care setting, rehabilitation centers and long-term care 
facilities found that in 83% of the sample, the diagnosis of MCS was based on visual 
responses captured by the CRS-R [16]. In a recent study of 282 patients in chronic MCS, 
visual fixation and pursuit were the most frequently observed markers of consciousness to 
emerge (57% and 52% of cases, respectively), followed by reproducible movement to 
command (51%) [17]. The same study found that visual fixation, visual pursuit, reproducible 
movement to command, localization to pain and automatic motor behavior, alone or 
combined, identified 99% of patients in MCS. Finally, Bagnato and colleagues showed that 
among 31 individuals admitted to a rehabilitation program in UWS/VS, 20 recovered 
conscious awareness within 1 year, most often signaled by reemergence of visual fixation and 
pursuit [18].  
Despite strong evidence that visual fixation and pursuit often emerge first in patients 
recovering from coma and UWS/VS, over-reliance on these behaviors may be problematic. 
Bruno and colleagues challenged the premise that visual fixation is representative of 










consciousness because they found no difference in cortico-cortical connectivity of the visual 
cortex on FDG-PET or in recovery rates between patients who demonstrated fixation and 
those who did not [19]. A review by Overbeek and others concluded that the existing 
evidence in support of visual fixation and pursuit as signs of consciousness is inconclusive 
because of confounding factors in assessment (e.g., orbital injury, oculomotor dysfunction), 
inconsistent operational definitions and other factors [20]. Apart from these concerns about 
the relevance of fixation and pursuit to consciousness, previous natural history studies 
focusing on recovery of consciousness were compromised by methodologic limitations 
including assessment of MCS behaviors without controlling for time since injury and failure 
to stratify cases with traumatic and non-traumatic brain injury (TBI, non-TBI).  
To address these concerns, we aimed to monitor the frequency with which 13 different 
behavioral markers of consciousness first emerge in patients transitioning from coma or 
UWS/VS to MCS or eMCS. Our secondary aim was to determine whether the etiology of 
injury (TBI vs non-TBI) affected the emergence of specific behavioral markers of 
consciousness or the time to emergence of consciousness.  
Material and methods 
Procedures 
 Demographic and behavioral data were retrospectively extracted from a REDCap [21] 
database that houses clinical data elements collected by multidisciplinary rehabilitation teams 
caring for patients admitted to a specialized inpatient DoC rehabilitation program. During the 
program, the CRS-R is administered twice per week until discontinuation criteria are met (i.e., 
maximum score is attained on the Motor, Communication and Arousal subscales over 3 
consecutive assessments, signifying eMCS). Participants met the following inclusion criteria: 
1) at least 17 years old, 2) documented medical diagnosis of coma or CRS-R–based diagnosis 
of UWS/VS on admission to the DoC program and 3) evidence of transition to consciousness 










during the inpatient rehabilitation stay, defined as 2 consecutive complete CRS-R assessments 
obtained within 7 days indicating a new MCS or eMCS diagnosis.  
Outcomes 
 We investigated the following outcomes: 1) incidence of the first behavioral marker(s) 
of consciousness to emerge after coma or UWS/VS, 2) time to recovery of consciousness and, 
3) effect of etiology (TBI vs non-TBI) on the incidence of first behavioral marker(s) and time 
to recovery of consciousness. We also explored whether etiology had a significant influence 
on CRS-R total score and number of conscious behaviors recovered at the time of recovery of 
consciousness. We defined recovery of consciousness as emergence from coma or UWS/VS 
to MCS or eMCS. Table 1 shows the operational definitions of the CRS-R subscale items that 
represent behavioral signs of MCS and eMCS.  
Statistical analyses 
 We used descriptive statistics (medians, interquartile ranges [IQR]) to summarize the 
demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample. We calculated incidence rates for the 
first behavioral sign of MCS or eMCS to emerge by using percentages with 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs). Differences between the TBI and non-TBI groups in time to recovery of 
consciousness, CRS-R total score at the time of transition and number of conscious behaviors 
recovered at the time of transition were tested by Wilcoxon (W) Rank Sum tests. Results were 
considered significant at p < 0.05. To investigate the effect of etiology on the emergence of 
conscious behaviors, behaviors were clustered into 3 categories: 1) language abilities (i.e., 
consistent and reproducible command following, intelligible verbalization, intentional and 
functional communication); 2) motor abilities (i.e., functional object use, automatic 
movement, object manipulation, localization to pain); and 3) visuoperceptual abilities (object 
recognition, object localization, visual pursuit, visual fixation). Differences between TBI and 
non-TBI groups were tested by Fisher exact test. For this analysis, multiple comparisons using 










Bonferroni correction (3 comparisons) were performed and results were considered 
significant at p< 0.016 (i.e., 0.05/3). 
Results 
Between June 2012 and August 2017, 110 patients with severe acquired brain injury 
were admitted to the DoC program in an unconscious state (6 comatose; 104 with UWS/VS; 
70 males; 52 with TBI; median [IQR] age 44 [27–60] years; median 28 [21–39] days after 
injury). Causes of non-traumatic injury included subarachnoid hemorrhage, intracerebral 
hemorrhage, subdural hematoma, cardiac arrest, aneurysm rupture, and hydrocephalus. As 
presented in Figure 1, 79 patients met the inclusion criteria (51 males; 6 comatose; 73 with 
UWS/VS; 34 with TBI; median age 48 [26–61] years; median 26 [20–36] days after injury). 
The median [IQR] time patients were followed was 61 [42–98] days and the median 
number of assessments conducted per patient was 16 [11–25). The median time from program 
admission to baseline CRS-R exam was 1 [1–1] day and the median time between consecutive 
CRS-R assessments was 4 [3–5] days. The TBI group was significantly younger than the non-
TBI group (median TBI age 33 [23–53] vs 57 [33–64] years, W=1077; p=0.002). The TBI 
and non-TBI groups did not differ in initial CRS-R total score (median 4 [3–6] vs 4 [3–6], 
W=748; p=0.869) or time from injury to admission (28.5 [20–36] vs 25 [20–36], W=689; 
p=0.454) (Table 2).   
Emergence of first signs of MCS or eMCS 
Visual pursuit was the most common initial behavioral sign of MCS, observed in 41% (95% 
CI 30–52) of individuals recovering from coma and UWS/VS (Figure 2). The next 2 most 
commonly observed behavioral signs of MCS, observed in approximately one quarter of 
participants, were reproducible movement to command (25%; 95% CI [16–35]) and automatic 
movement (24%; 95% CI [15–33]). The remaining 10 behavioral markers of consciousness 
emerged first in less than 16% of the sample.  










In 72% (95% CI [62–82], n=57) of participants, recovery of consciousness was 
signaled by the emergence of a single behavior; in 16% (95% CI [8–24], n=13), 2 behavioral 
signs of MCS emerged within 7 days of recovery of consciousness; and in 6% (95% CI [0–
10], n=5), 3 behaviors emerged within 7 days of transition.  
Time to emergence of consciousness 
 The median [IQR] time to emergence of the first sign(s) of MCS or eMCS was 44 
[33–59] days after injury and 14 [6–26] days after admission to the DoC program. The TBI 
and non-TBI groups did not differ in time to recovery of consciousness (W=931; p =0.517), 
number of conscious behaviors recovered at the time of transition to consciousness (W= 673; 
p =0.250) or total CRS-R score at the time of transition (W = 664.5; p =0.317) (Table 2).  
All but 2 participants showed the typical course of recovery, progressing from coma to 
UWS/VS, MCS and then eMCS. Two patients transitioned directly from UWS/VS to eMCS 
by recovering functional object use. When behaviors were categorized into domain-specific 
clusters, we found some influence of etiology of injury on the frequency with which specific 
behaviors marked the transition to consciousness. More patients with TBI than non-TBI 
recovered motor signs of MCS first (p=0.011) (Figure 3). We found no between-group 
differences in language (p=0.99) or visual (p=0.066) clusters. 
Discussion 
Recovery of consciousness is a critical milestone in patients who sustain severe brain 
injury. Early detection of consciousness portends a more favorable prognosis [22,23] and is 
often required for admission to an inpatient rehabilitation facility. Bedside behavioral 
assessment, the gold standard for detecting conscious awareness, suggests that visual fixation 
and pursuit are often the first behavioral signs of consciousness to emerge in patients 
recovering from coma and UWS/VS. However, these behaviors cannot always be accurately 
assessed. The aim of this study was to systematically monitor behavioral recovery in patients 










with severe acquired brain injury to capture the first behavior(s) signaling the transition from 
coma or UWS/VS to eMCS. We also investigated the length of time from onset to transition 
to MCS, and the effect of etiology (TBI vs non-TBI) on behavioral recovery.  
Among the 13 behavioral signs of MCS and eMCS monitored, visual pursuit emerged 
first in most patients, accounting for 41% of participants. Visual pursuit is well-documented 
as an early indicator of recovery of consciousness [15,24,25]. This finding likely reflects at 
least partial recovery of brainstem-cortical connectivity necessary for support of both basic 
arousal functions and eye movements. Inputs from the vestibular nuclei to the pons mediate 
arousal regulation and activate downstream frontal and parietal cortices responsible for eye 
movement control [26]. Although we did not find a significant between-group difference, 
both visual pursuit and fixation were observed more frequently in non-TBI than TBI 
participants, possibly suggesting better preservation of this pathway in individuals with 
anoxic and vascular injuries.  
Reproducible command-following and automatic movement were the next 2 most 
frequent signs of MCS to emerge first, observed in approximately 25% of participants. Unlike 
visual fixation and pursuit, command-following is recognized as a definitive sign of conscious 
awareness [27] and, as such, is widely used in bedside examination. Prior studies involving 
patients with MCS report demonstrable evidence of command-following in 14% to 51% of 
cases [16–18]. Apart from the current investigation, only one other study prospectively 
monitored behavioral markers of recovery of consciousness [18]. Bagnato and colleagues 
found that reproducible command-following marked the transition from unconsciousness to 
consciousness in 14% of 21 patients studied, and no patient was able to follow commands 
consistently (defined as clearly discernible responses in 4 consecutive trials of 2 different 
commands). Our findings fall within the fairly broad range previously reported. It is not clear 
what accounts for the variability in the incidence of command-following, although this may 










be due to differences in how command-following is assessed or the confounding influence of 
sedating medications. There are no universal standards governing which commands should be 
administered, how many trials should be conducted or how responses should be interpreted. In 
line with prior studies, we found that consistent command-following rarely reemerges within 
7 days of recovery of consciousness. Bagnato and colleagues also reported lower rates of 
automatic movement (5% vs 24% in the present sample) and higher rates of object 
manipulation (18% v. 5% in the present sample) [18], again, possibly reflecting differences in 
assessment or scoring methods. 
Automatic movements are over-learned behaviors that tend to be repetitive and are 
triggered by interoceptive or exteroceptive stimuli. They closely resemble automatisms [28], 
actions that occur without intent during episodes of complex partial seizure. Examples of 
automatic motor behavior include nose-scratching, hand-wringing and assuming stereotypical 
postures. The presence of automatic behavior suggests at least partial preservation of self and 
environmental awareness. These behaviors are triggered when primary sensory cortices detect 
an internal (e.g., itch) or external (e.g., object entering the visual field) stimulus. Neural 
signals are then sent to downstream association cortices for further perceptual encoding (e.g., 
what kind of object is this?), and ultimately to the motor cortex, which initiates the specific 
movement sequence associated with the triggering stimulus (e.g., scratching the itch, grasping 
the object). These processing steps suggest that some awareness of self and environment must 
be retained to engage this type of behavior. This premise is supported by a study by Remi and 
colleagues [29]. These investigators followed a cohort of patients with severe acute stroke and 
found that patients who exhibited automatic behavior, specifically, leg-crossing while seated, 
achieved significantly more favorable functional outcomes at 1 year post-injury.  
The remaining 10 behavioral signs of MCS or eMCS emerged first in 0 to 15% of our 
participants. This is not surprising given that 6 of these 10 behaviors — functional 










communication, intentional communication, functional object use, consistent command-
following, intelligible verbalization and object recognition — depend on well-preserved 
network connectivity. It is not clear why the remaining four behaviors — object manipulation, 
object localization, localization to pain and visual fixation — infrequently emerged first. 
In most cases (72%), recovery of consciousness was heralded by a single behavior. 
This finding strongly suggests that the evaluation of individuals with DoC should incorporate 
a range of different behaviors. Inadequate behavioral sampling likely contributes to the 40% 
misdiagnosis rate consistently reported in the literature [6–8]. The approach to assessment 
should include procedures designed to reliably detect visual pursuit, command-following and 
automatic movements. Visual pursuit should be assessed by using a mirror because of 
evidence that the auto-referential aspect of one’s own face is a highly salient stimulus [30]. 
Eye tracking devices adapted for patients with DoC have also been developed [31] but may be 
difficult to calibrate due to associated cognitive, visual, visuoperceptual and oculomotor 
disturbance. Command-following should be systematically assessed with standardized 
administration and scoring procedures such as those used by the CRS-R [9], Wessex Head 
Injury Matrix [32] or the Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique [33]. 
Individualized quantitative behavioral assessment procedures, which rely on single-subject 
research methods, can reliably differentiate command-following from random behavior 
[34,35]. Automatic movements, by their nature, may be difficult to elicit on bedside 
examination. The CRS-R includes assessment methods designed to capture all these 
behaviors[9]. Serial assessment remains essential in view of the fluctuations in arousal and 
vigilance that characterize this population. [13,34]  
Regarding time to recovery of consciousness, the first behavioral sign of MCS or 
eMCS tended to emerge approximately 6 weeks after the injury (median 44 days). This 
finding generally concurs with 2 prior studies reporting recovery of consciousness within 12 










weeks of injury [18,36]. Precise behavior-specific estimates of time to recovery of 
consciousness could not be provided by either of the earlier studies because neither performed 
weekly follow-up. Like Bagnato, et al. [18], we did not find a significant difference between 
the TBI and non-TBI groups in time to recovery of consciousness.    
We found that motor behaviors marked the transition to consciousness significantly 
more often in patients with TBI relative to those with non-TBI, possibly reflecting 
pathophysiologic differences between these groups. Non-traumatic lesions arising from severe 
hypoxic-ischemic events preferentially damage brain regions with high oxygen consumption 
demands [37,38]. Involvement of the basal ganglia, which have high metabolic demand for 
oxygen and play an important role in motor control, may account for the lower frequency of 
automatic movements noted in the non-TBI group. In a few cases, behaviors reflecting higher 
levels of neurologic function (e.g., functional object use) emerged before lower-level 
behaviors (e.g., localization to pain) during the transition to consciousness. More frequent 
(daily vs weekly) CRS-R assessment may have captured these lower-level behaviors at the 
time of transition.  
This study has some limitations that may affect the generalizability of the results. We 
included only individuals who transitioned to or emerged from MCS after admission to an 
inpatient rehabilitation facility at 3 to 5 weeks post-injury, which represents a selection bias. 
Thus, patients who transitioned earlier than 3 weeks after injury were not captured and may 
have experienced a different behavioral recovery profile. We are not aware of any studies that 
systematically tracked recovery of consciousness during the acute period by using repeated 
standardized neurobehavioral assessment. Acute studies are necessary to more fully 
characterize the natural history of recovery of consciousness. Second, this study was 
conducted at a single site. Although the sample size was fairly large and the demographic 
characteristics were typical of subacute DoC, there may be local differences that limit 










generalizability. Finally, the data were collected by clinical staff, which raises the possibility 
of procedural variability. Some behaviors, such as visual fixation and pursuit, are particularly 
susceptible to this problem. There is evidence that both visual fixation and pursuit are more 
likely to occur in response to presentation of a mirror as compared to an object or person 
[30,39,40]. This concern is mitigated by the fact that the CRS-R has strong inter-rater 
reliability [9,41,42] and all clinical staff were required to undergo training before using the 
scale. 
We also wish to raise a more general issue that relates to the focus of the study. The 
relationship between observable behavior and the “contents of consciousness” is unclear 
because one cannot reliably infer self or environmental awareness based solely on behavior 
[43–45]. In the absence of subjective reports, behavior is a non-specific indicator of level of 
consciousness. For example, smiling may represent a cognitively-mediated conscious state (as 
in amusement while listening to a humorous story), the pathologic release of an over-learned 
behavioral response (i.e., as in pseudobulbar affect) or even reflexive activity (as in muscle 
spasm arising from risus sardonicus) [44]. In light of this concern, Naccache and colleagues 
have proposed a re-conceptualization of traditional behavioral signs of consciousness. They 
suggest that behavioral signs such as visual fixation and pursuit should be described as 
“cortically-mediated behaviors” rather than “signs of consciousness” to avoid over-
interpretation in terms of subjective content [43]. In contrast, the recently released US-based 
practice guidelines for the diagnosis of patients with DoC published by the American 
Academy of Neurology, American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine and National Institute 
on Disability, Independent Living and Rehabilitation Research endorsed these behaviors as 
“signs of consciousness,” which illustrates the ongoing debate around this issue [34]. 
Conclusions 










In patients recovering from coma and UWS/VS during inpatient rehabilitation, visual 
pursuit, command-following and automatic movements are typically the first behavioral signs 
marking the transition to MCS or eMCS (observed in 24-41% of our participants). Among 
patients who remain unconscious for 3 to 5 weeks after injury, recovery of consciousness is 
usually marked by a single behavior and the median time to recovery is approximately 44 
days in both TBI and non-TBI cases. Clinicians should ensure that assessment methods are 
especially sensitive to these 3 behaviors. Future studies should investigate the recovery course 
of behavioral signs of MCS during the acute period as well as the association between the 
time to emergence of specific behaviors and long-term functional outcome.  
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Figure 1. Participant flow diagram. DoC, Disorders of Consciousness; MCS, Minimally 
Conscious State; eMCS, emergence from the MCS; CRS-R, Coma Recovery Scale-Revised 
Figure 2. Proportion of patients (n=79) presenting each behavior as the first sign of a 
minimally conscious state. Bars indicate the percentage of the sample that recovered each 
behavior as the first indication of MCS or eMCS. Visual pursuit (41%), reproducible 
movement to command (25%) and automatic movement (24%) were commonly observed as 
the first MCS/eMCS behaviors to emerge. The remaining 10 behaviors emerged first in less 
than 16% of the sample. 










Figure 3. Comparison of behavioral recovery by domain in participants with traumatic brain 
injury (TBI) and non-TBI. Motor behaviors emerged first significantly more often in the TBI 
(n=34) versus non-TBI (n=45) group (* p=0.011), with no difference in frequency of recovery 
of language (p=0.99) or visual (p=0.066) signs of MCS.  
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